A MUSLIM INVASION IS NOT A REFUGEE PROBLEM, IT IS AN INVASION TO SUBVERT A CULTURE

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hungary (Tamas Kovacs : MTI via AP)

What the Migrant Crisis Means for the Future of the West

CRISIS MAGAZINE

A Voice for the Faithful Catholic Laity

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Why the uptick in Muslim migrants and refugees? The answer is Hijrah!

Hijrah is jihad by emigration. It means moving to a new land – colonizing – in order to

bring Islam there. In Islam it is considered to be a holy and revered action.

“He who forsakes his home in the cause of Allah, finds in the earth many a

refuge, wide and spacious: Should he die as a refuge from home for Allah

and His Messenger, his reward becomes due and sure with Allah: And

Allah is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful.” (Qur’ān, Sūrah 4:100)

This explains the great eagerness to undertake such a perilous journey.

– Abyssum

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For months, the news has been flooded with stories about waves of “migrants” descending on Europe from war-ravaged Syria and elsewhere in the Mideast. We also hear about repeated attempts by lesser numbers of people to slip into Europe by sea, usually with the aid of smugglers, from North Africa. This is against the backdrop of the longer-running large scale Islamic immigration into Europe and the illegal immigrants entering the U.S. from Latin America. The tendency by the reporting media and many in the Church has been to view this from a strictly humanitarian standpoint: people either are fleeing war or political persecution or they are crossing borders to seek a better life for themselves and their families. So, it is said that there is a moral obligation to accept and assist them and even integrate them into their new nations. This viewpoint suggests that it makes no difference about who comes into a nation and that there will be no consequences from any kind of migration at any scale. Is this true?

We certainly know about the historic reality of ethnic conflict. It was not so long ago that we witnessed it strikingly and tragically as Yugoslavia, after being held together by a strong-man Communist regime for fifty years, was torn apart. Certainly, ethnic conflicts have been among the most abundant sources of intra-nation turmoil. There are certainly others: religious, political, sectional. The latter two characterized the U.S.’s most serious internal convulsion, the Civil War. Migration seems to be distinguished from taking in refugees in that migrants (not really different from immigrants) are permanently relocating to their new country, whereas refugees are probably there just temporarily until conditions permit them to return home. The fundamental issue about the effect of migration on the receiving nations concerns what in sound social ethics is called the civic bond. Following Aristotle’s fourfold notion of causation of any organism or entity—final, formal, material, and efficient—the formal cause of any political order or state is the civic bond.

This involves a notion of a common public good, or simply a common good, which unites men into a political union. It includes a common conception of what is called civic justice, which encompasses the whole range of rights and duties of the individuals and families making up the state that must be carried out so the common good is achieved. Catholic political scientist John J. Schrems calls a nation’s common good its “unifying element,” or the “glue” that holds together a particular people in a particular territory under a particular government. Sometimes, for a period of time, a nation can be held together, like Yugoslavia was and others might be even without a repressive government forcing it, if the common good is shared only partly or if there are sharp differences in what that common good is. In the long run, though, its prospects to survive as a national political community are not good.

The meaning of this for the current migrant situation is that when people become part of a country, they have to believe in the basic principles that unite it. These include constitutional-legal principles and fundamental political philosophy, to be sure, but also certain basic ethical norms, social mores, and religious perspectives. People don’t have to all be the same religion to peacefully and cooperatively share the same political community, but they cannot be deeply in opposition or resistant to accommodating their worldviews. We cannot dispute that ethnic commonality can be important in holding a political community together (somewhat as Yugoslavia demonstrated), but it is possible that cross-cutting attachments such as religious, cultural, social, and politico-legal orientations may overcome these or even be the deeper basis for these or can emerge as more important.

The most contentious aspect of European migration in recent years, even before the current migrant crisis, has concerned Moslems from the Mideast. Indeed, there is much question about whether the most recent wave of migrants is mostly made up of people fleeing Syria or others who, like these previous Islamic immigrants, just want to resettle in Europe because of the perceived better life and opportunities—and welfare state benefits—that it presents for them. That might be well and good, but when immigrants come the unspoken understanding is that they must accept and accommodate themselves to the country they go to and not the other way around. In the case of Moslem immigrants, particularly in this era of jihad and Islamic terrorism and in light of the serious scholarship about the repudiation of reason in the long tradition of Sunni Islamic thought as traced by writers such as Robert R. Reilly, it is a legitimate question about whether the basic considerations mentioned as necessary to maintain the civic bond or common good of countries is likely.

The pattern of Islamic immigrants resisting acculturation into their new countries, seeking the establish “their own rules” such as sharia law for their enclaves as their population grows in size, and then seeking to effect broader political, legal, and socio-cultural change as they approach a majority buttresses this concern. Reilly has convincingly argued that these deeper concerns—the age-old intellectual crisis in the predominant (Sunni) strain of Islam—have everything to do with these large socio-political questions. There are indeed “moderate” Moslems, who might more readily fit into Western political societies, but there is much reason to doubt that this more than a distinct minority.

So a Europe already reeling from large-scale Islamic immigration and the unprecedented challenges and problems—and homegrown Jihadist threats—it has brought with it has every reason to proceed cautiously, and to be reluctant, about readily accepting a new immigrant wave from the Mideast. Displaced Christians—who have suffered some of the worst oppression in the Mideast—could probably make a relatively easy transition because of their fundamentally compatible worldview (despite what secular European elites think, Europe has fundamentally been shaped by its Christian tradition). It does not appear, however, that most of these recent migrants are Christians.

The issue of the civic bond is not as acute with the immigrants coming to the U.S. from south of the border, since most are at least nominally Christian. The word “nominal” must give pause, however, since Mexico has long been a “mixed bag”—partly Catholic, but mostly secular, for over a hundred years. Perhaps the more significant problem is presented by the immigrants’—especially the millions here illegally—reluctance to embrace our underlying political philosophy, constitutional-legal norms, and certain social mores and to turn their allegiance to their new country, so they don’t think that being part of the shared vision about the ends for our political community is even relevant.

In From Cottage to Work Station, social historian Allan C. Carlson says that the Immigration Act of 1965, which favored immigrants from Third World countries, created “a new ethnic diversity and a consequent splintering of values and the sense of a shared experience, which seem to defy all efforts at rebuilding cohesion.”

Parenthetically, when one thinks of the civic bond and shared ends, a similar danger presents itself in the U.S. that has nothing to do with immigration. With our witnessing an increasingly deep and rigid internal division between fundamentally divergent worldviews about many of these same matters—e.g., what’s to be the nature and purpose of our politics, whether the constitutional principles bequeathed to us by our Founding should stand or whether they are persistently changing, basic ethical norms, even what the very dignity of man should consist of—it seems that much of our civic bond has dissipated and there is not much of a shared vision of the common good.

Political communities have torn asunder because of considerably less basic divisions. Lincoln thought that the U.S. was too strong to fall prey to a foreign adversary, but feared that it could collapse due to internal division and conflict. So, fissures can rent a political community either from a flood of newcomers with a sharply different worldview or the growth internally of philosophical and ideological division—and can ultimately tear it apart. A political community can sharply decline or collapse when substantial elements of its population are no longer united in a true civic bond.

(Photo credit: Tamas Kovacs / MTI via AP)

Stephen M. Krason

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Stephen M. Krason’s “Neither Left nor Right, but Catholic” column appears monthly (sometimes bi-monthly) in Crisis Magazine. He is Professor of Political Science and Legal Studies and associate director of the Veritas Center for Ethics in Public Life at Franciscan University of Steubenville. He is also co-founder and president of the Society of Catholic Social Scientists. He is the author, most recently, of The Transformation of the American Democratic Republic (Transaction Publishers, 2012), and editor of three volumes: Child Abuse, Family Rights, and the Child Protective System (Scarecrow Press, 2013) and The Crisis of Religious Liberty (Rowman and Littlefield, 2014); and most recently, Challenging the Secular Culture: A Call to Christians (Franciscan University Press, forthcoming).

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Muslim population growth

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

World Muslim population by percentage (Pew Research Center, 2014)

Muslim population growth refers to the topic of population growth of the global Muslim community. In 2006, countries with a Muslim majority had an average population growth rate of 1.8% per year (when weighted by percentage Muslim and population size).[1] This compares with a world population growth rate of 1.02% per year.[2] As of 2011, it is predicted that the world’s Muslim population will grow twice as fast as non-Muslims over the next 20 years. By 2030, Muslims will make up more than a quarter of the global population. If current trends continue, it is predicted by the year 2100 that about 1% more of the world’s population will be Muslim (35%) than Christian (34%).[3]

Globally, Muslims have the highest fertility rate, an average of 3.1 children per woman – well above replacement level (2.1), the minimum typically needed to maintain a stable population. Christians are second, at 2.7 children per woman. Hindu fertility (2.4) is similar to the global average (2.5). Worldwide, Jewish fertility (2.3 children per woman) also is above replacement level. All the other groups have fertility levels too low to sustain their populations and would require converts to grow or maintain their size: folk religions (1.8 children per woman), other religions (1.7), the unaffiliated (1.7) and Buddhists (1.6).[3]

According to the World Christian Encyclopedia, published in 2001, the fastest-growing branch of Islam is Ahmadiyya.[4] It is often reported from other various sources in 2010, including the German domestic intelligence service, that Salafism is the fastest-growing Islamic movement in the world.[5][6][7][8]Politics

Estimating Muslim population growth is related to contentious political issues. Some Islamic organizations have accused American demographers of releasing falsely low population numbers of Muslims in the United States to justify the marginalization of Muslims.[9]

By region

World

  • According to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the World Christian Database as of 2007 estimated the six fastest-growing religions of the world to be Islam (1.84%), the Bahá’í Faith (1.7%), Sikhism (1.62%), Jainism (1.57%), Hinduism (1.52%), and Christianity (1.32%). High birth rates were cited as the reason for the growth.[10] However, according to others, including the Guinness World Records, Islam is the world’s fastest-growing religion by number of conversions each year.[11]
  • Monsignor Vittorio Formenti, who compiles the Vatican‘s yearbook, said in an interview with the Vatican newspaper L’Osservatore Romano that “For the first time in history, we are no longer at the top: Muslims have overtaken us”. He said that Catholics accounted for 17.4 percent of the world population—a stable percentage—while Muslims were at 19.2 percent. “It is true that while Muslim families, as is well known, continue to make a lot of children, Christian ones on the contrary tend to have fewer and fewer,” the monsignor said.[12]

Asia

Islam is currently the largest religion in Asia. According to the Pew Research Center, nearly three-in-ten people living in the Asia-Pacific region in 2030 (27.3%) will be Muslim, up from about a quarter in 2010 (24.8%) and roughly a fifth in 1990 (21.6%).[13]

India

Islam is the fastest-growing religion in India.[14] The ratio of young children (age 0–6) to the total population is also significantly higher among Muslims than Hindus in India.[15][16] Demographers have put forward several factors behind high birthrates among Muslims in India. Sociologists point out that religious factors can explain high Muslim birthrates. Surveys indicate that Muslims in India have been relatively far less willing to adopt family planning measures and that Indian Muslim girls get married at a much younger age compared to non-Muslim girls.[17] According to Paul Kurtz, Muslims in India are much more resistant to modern contraceptive measures compared to other Indians and, as a consequence, the decline in fertility rate among non-Muslim women is much higher compared to that of Muslim women.[18][19] According to a 2006 committee appointed by the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, if the current trend continues, by the end of the 21st century India’s Muslim population will reach 320 to 340 million people (or 18-19% of India’s total projected population).[20] Islam is the second-largest religion in India, making up 14.88% of the country’s population with about 180 million adherents (2011 census).[21][22] India has the second largest population of Muslims, after Indonesia.[23]

China

In China, Muslim population growth was 2.7% during 1964-1982, compared to 2.1% for the population as the next two decades from 2011. Pew Research Center projects a slowing down of Muslim population growth in China than in previous years, with Muslim women in China having a 1.7 fertility rate.[24] Many Hui Muslims voluntarily limit themselves to one child in China since their Imams preach to them about the benefits of population control. The amount of children, in different areas, people are allowed to have varies between one and three children.[25] Chinese family planning policy allows minorities, including Muslims, to have up to two children in urban areas, and three to four children in rural areas.

Europe

See also: Islam in Europe

Islam is the fastest-growing religion in Europe.[26][27] According to the Pew Research Center, the Muslim population in Europe (excluding Turkey) was about 30 million in 1990, 44 million in 2010 and is expected to increase to 58 million by 2030; the Muslim share of the population increased from 4.1% in 1990 to 6% in 2010 and will continue to increase over the next 40 years, reaching 10% in 2050.[3][28] There were approximately 19 million Muslims in the European Union in 2010.

Data for the rates of growth of Islam in Europe reveal that the growing number of Muslims is due primarily to immigration and higher birth rates.[29] Muslim women today have an average of 2.2 children compared to an estimated average of 1.5 children for non-Muslim women in Europe.[3] While the birth rate for Muslims in Europe is expected to decline over the next two decades, it will remain slightly higher than in the non-Muslim population,[3] except for Dutch-Turks, who have a lower birthrate (1.7) than the native Dutch population (1.8).[30][31]

Based on the current growth rate of Islam in Europe, in 2030, Muslims are projected to make up more than 10% of the total population in 10 European countries: Kosovo (93.5%), Albania (83.2%), Bosnia-Herzegovina (42.7%), Republic of Macedonia (40.3%), Montenegro (21.5%), Bulgaria (15.7%), Russia (14.4%), Georgia (11.5%), France (10.3%) and Belgium (10.2%).[32] There are around 100,000 Muslim converts in the UK.[33][34] France has seen conversions to the Islamic faith double in the past quarter century. In France there are an estimated 100,000 Muslim converts, compared with about 50,000 in 1986.[35]

By denomination

The following table lists historical growth rates by schools and branches in Islam as published by the previous two editions of the World Christian Encyclopedia.

Branches/Schools Growth rate (%) in 1982 Growth rate (%) in 2001
Sunni
Hanafi 2.77 2.07
Shafi 2.89 2.20
Maliki 2.36 2.00
Hanbali 2.73 2.20
Shia
Twelver 2.78 2.23
Isma’ili 3.35 2.70
Zaydi 2.75 2.30
Alawites 2.75
Ahmadi 4.18 3.25
Khariji 2.70 2.10
Wahhabi 1.37

Conversion

Sources show the growth of Islam occurs mainly due to reproduction. Only 0.28% (3,220,000 people) of the expected Muslim population growth (1,161,780,000) in the period of 2010-2050 would be due to conversions; 99.72% would be due to a high birth rate among Muslims.[3][36][37] In the period 1990–2000, approximately 12.5 million more people converted to Islam than to Christianity.[11] According to The New York Times, an estimated 25 percent of American Muslims are converts.[38] In Britain, around 6,000 people convert to Islam per year and according to a June 2000 article in the British Muslims Monthly Survey the bulk of new Muslim converts in Britain were women. According to NBC news report, every year around 20,000 people in U.S.A convert to Islam.[citation needed] [34] This trend has significantly reversed since 2001, however, as Islam is increasingly seen as linked to religious extremism. Studies estimate significantly more people have converted from Islam to Christianity in the 21st century than at any other point in Islamic history.[39] The increasingly large Ex-Muslim communities in the Western world that adhere to no religion have also been well documented.[40]

About abyssum

I am a retired Roman Catholic Bishop, Bishop Emeritus of Corpus Christi, Texas
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1 Response to A MUSLIM INVASION IS NOT A REFUGEE PROBLEM, IT IS AN INVASION TO SUBVERT A CULTURE

  1. And what of the role played by Pope Francis, his almost criminally naive suggestion that this Mohammedan horde be absorbed by Europe? You really have to wonder whose side he is on.

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